THE JURISTIC PERSON.-III.
For the purpose of adjusting rights where they conflict
with the rights of others or where they are modified by the
rights of others the law finds it necessary to consider a
right as located in some individual or personality. These
rights must at times be administered without reference to
their ultimate holder-that is, without reference to the
person who may in the end derive the benefit of them.
The person or personality in which the right may be considered as vested is known as the Destinataire of the right.
It has been seen above that the law, in the majority of
cases where corporate rights are involved, is never called
upon to pursue the rights beyond the corporate body; that
is, the law for the purpose of administration, for the purpose of adjusting rights as between a corporation and a
private individual, or another corporation, must deal with
the rights of the corporation as if they were vested in some
distinct personality. The law has always accepted this fact
as it was, and called the rights those of a fictitious person.
The thought that what the law was dealing with was
actually a person of a certain kind, did not originate in a
desire for mystery; it was something more than mere scholastic quibble. There are problems in which the group stands
opposed to the individual although he may be a member of
the group;-there are situations in which the rights of
groups themselves are antagonistic, and these rights must
be administered as group rights.
It must be recognized that the mere motive force that
lifts an object and puts it in a different position, acts by
virtue of a principle that is absolutely intangible. That is
true of the manifestations of electricity and other subtle
forces of nature; it is equally true of acts that result from
a mental force. If we transfer this thought to the corporation it will be readily conceded that the physical activity
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of a corporation is produced by the mental activity of the
associates. The decision of the stockholders acting as a
unit is not the distinct act of any individual, it is the resultant of desires never entirely harmonious but fused together by discussion and compromise, We may consider
this collective consciousness as the personality of the
corporation.
It is true that the ultimate holder of the right should
never be ignored. But it is impossible to reach the corporation through him. And in fact, he is the least interesting, the least momentous fact in corporate life, as an
individual, after he has entered the corporate sphere. The
rights of the corporation are never administered as stockholders' rights because they cannot be. The rights of a
group of individuals united together for a common purpose,
the purpose to be pursued as a common enterprise, are the
rights of the group as a group. And group rights are not
in the least spectral. It is the group personality that concerns the law.
When its rights and duties are considered, it is treated
as capable of bearing them, whereupon arises immediately
the problem of whether or not it is self-sufficient or autonomous-whether or not it is responsible?
The answer to these questions is found in the facts themselves. Responsibility for corporate acts is invariably fastened upon the corporation itself. It brings suits as a
unity and defends them as a unit. The stockholder never
becomes visible in any transaction so long as corporate life
lasts. In the conferring upon it of certain rights there is
exacted from it corresponding duties, and if the activity of
the group and the property of the group afford the machinery through which an offense is committed, it is the group
and not any individual to which responsibility is affixed.
But while it is correct to speak of legal subjectivity or
legal capacity in a corporation its capacity exists only in a
certain circumscribed sphere. There is a line drawn between individual activity and corporate activity. The object of the formation of the corporation is, it is true, to
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make possible the accomplishment of things impossible for
an individual, but they are matters of a special and not of
a general kind. The implication of human personality is
unfettered power to act subject to the regulations of an
entire legal and judicial system. The implication of corporate personality is power to act only within a certain
sphere-the corporate sphere.
There is nothing absurd in the statement that there are
no such things as the natural rights of corporations. Certain of them are in their nature impossible. Such are rights
of family and other rights by their nature incompatible with
collective exercise. There is no need to visualize further
the juristic person. We do not need to feel its antenna
to feel certain of its existence. The fact exists that the
moment a powerful group begins to act toward a common
end it produces a capacity for aggression that individuals
can only in the rarest cases combat. It is not important
whether they effect their purpose by massing property together or whether the powers and influences controlled by
the entire group are concentrated upon the accomplishment
of the object. It presents the old problem of genus against
species and the genus must in the very nature of things
prevail.
And from this circumstance arises the necessity on the part
of the state of confining group activity within certain definite lines in order that the effects of its activity may with
some degree of precision be measured.
Let us for an instant consider the question of responsibility for acts ordinarily prohibited. Suppose the existence
of a great fund of property makes possible the commission
of certain misdemeanors. If responsibility can attach only
to the individuals who perpetrate the act there is left in existence the same large fund of property which may be
manipulated by another person for the commission of some
other offense. When an offense becomes a corporate act
for which the corporation itself is responsible the individual interested in the prevention of the offense is multiplied
by the number of persons engaged in the enterprise. The
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stockholders acting together have certain powers of supervision, which they are bound to exercise, failing which
certain of their property rights are injured.
On the civil side, because of the diverse citizenship of the
persons associated, because of the difficulty of dealing with
any of the individuals associated, the law is obliged to deal
chiefly with a mass of property. But in dealing with a
mass of property the problem is almost invariably, what is
the nature of the act that affects the property, whether by
way of increasing it, by way of enforcing some rights
against it, or by way of changing its character. In other
words the courts are concerned with some one's activity in
connection with the property; that activity is manifested
usually by an agent of some sort, but an agent whose acts
are directed and controlled by the corporate will or by the
collective will. Now it is only for the collective will that
the juristic person is an expression. There is no way of
giving the juristic person a body any more than there is of
giving electricity or ether a body. The juristic person is
the expression simply for the collective activity of the
corporators.
The component elements of the juristic person are the
parts that the stockholders play in a joint or corporate act.
It has already been pointed out that a person has many
capacities, and that his act in each capacity is quite recognizable and is distinguished from his act in any other capacity. There is no danger of confusing the act of a father
with the act of the same man as a member or stockholder
of a corporation. Hence the law is bound to deal with a
group as a unity since it has no way whatever of reaching
the individuals that compose it.
In the case of railroad and other large corporations the
stockholders are scattered through all the known countries of
the globe, and there is no possible way of pursuing the individual responsibility of each member. It might be said that
a certain fragment of the personality of each stockholder is
subtracted from him and fusedwith similar fragments from
all the others to make up the personality.
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On the criminal side the situation is slightly different.
The law has almost invariably said that a corporation cannot sin, that crime is impossible for it; yet its statutes constantly pronounce certain acts committed by corporations
misdemeanors and impose penalties for them. The facts
of the matter are dealt with apparently on their own basis
without reference to their origin or significance. When the
fact arises and it is necessary to impose a penalty the penalty is imposed and the esoteric question of personality or
non-personality is ignored, if possible, but it cannot always
be ignored.
Since the real matter of importance is group activity such
questions as limitation of liability and the like have no
bearing on the determination of whether or not an act is in
its nature corporate. But even having eliminated this factor there is some difficulty in effecting a recognition of the
truth that corporations are not what most existing theories
of the corporation insist upon, viz: creatures of the state.
As a matter of fact the existence of the corporation is not
determined by the state but by its powers to act, which
are regulated and limited by the state. What really happens is that the state finding certain persons standing in a
certain relation to each other and acting as a unit, upon a
request from them, authorizes the group to embark upon a
certain course of activity.
In all organzations in which every party is an actual participant in the enterprise, each one having a general range
of individual action, no such thing as personification is either
desirable or useful. There is in such a case a common fund
of property just as there is in the case of a corporation, but
such groups neither act nor appear as a unity. The law,
therefore, is not interested in their personality when they
do act as a whole. In parodying the idea of juristic personality, the relation of husband and wife is sometimes dragged
into play, and the property rights of the spouses have been
represented as a juristic person. Problems are stated in
which impossible attributes are affixed to the corporate body.
Thus a case is reported in which building lots were sold
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subject to a restriction that they should not be used by or
transferred to negroes. One of the lots was purchased by
the congregation of a negro church. When the conveyance
to the church corporation was attacked the court gravely
decided that the corporation was an entity apart from the
colored members that composed it, and inferentially that
the entity was not colored.
It is the purpose of the theory of juristic personality
above all to furnish a useful working principle for the resolution of corporate problems. It was not intended to furnish
the doctors of jurisprudence with a cadaver that might serve
for dissecting purposes.
While the individual corporator as such is of small moment to the corporate group once it is formed there are certain spheres of activity within some of which the stockholders alone have power to act, and within others of which
activity is restricted to the group. There are other spheres
in which the rights more or less conflict.
A recent treatise on Constitutional Law contains a diagram in which the co-ordinate and conflicting powers of the
States and the United States are exhibited. The diagram is
a circle divided by lines into various segments, some of which
represent the exclusive domain of federal rights and powers,
others the exclusive domain of state rights and powers. There
are other segments common to both. The corporate and
individual fields of action might be similarly plotted.
The rights of the stockholders individually are of two
kinds; there are first of all, rights of participation. There
are secondly, rights of prohibition. Stated as affirmative
rights the sphere of the corporators' rights and activities
contains among others these: The shareholder has by virtue
of his interest in the enterprise a proportionate interest or
share in the corporate property, which is determined by the
extent of his holding or interest. By virtue of his proportionate share in the property he has a claim to whatever part
of the profits may fall to his share. Rights of this kind,
such as the claim to profits in the shape of dividends are
rights that the stockholder may enforce not only in accord-
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ance with the desire of the corporation, but even against the
desires of the corporation.
And there is further vested in each stockholder an
expectancy or reversionary interest in the corpus of corporate property. It is true that it is a right which looks to a
time subsequent to the extinction of corporate life. Each
shareholder has further separate rights in what may be
called the collectivity itself. He is interested in the maintenance of corporate rights unimpaired. And from this
right springs also a certain right of prohibition. Or he may
be given the choice of two alternatives; he is not compelled
to take the poorer choice of withdrawal from the enterprise,
but may insist on the maintenance of the entire corporate
rights unimpaired as something in which he has a substantive interest-an interest which he may defend by recourse to legal action. None the less he is entitled to withdraw if he can persuade some one else to take his place.
There are certain spheres within which the corporator alone
may act; as a corollary of this follows the right to prevent
corporate encroachment on his private rights. Growing out
of his right to the maintenance of collective rights unimpaired is the right to forbid the alteration of the character
of corporate property or the nature of the undertaking-a
right in fact to forbid acts that might change the nature of
corporate life. He may exact from the corporation equity
of treatment with the other stockholders; may forbid the
undue preference of another to the exclusion of himself.
On the side of activity within a certain sphere of influence, the stockholder is a participant in the corporate life.
The manner in which this participation is exercised is by
means of the right of suffrage; this is again the source of
various corollaries of the widest possible range. There is
first of all the right to insist upon the legal effect of whatever vote he may cast. He may enforce this right at lawhe may prevent its arbitrary exclusion. Negatively the
stockholder has the right to contest elections not held in
accordance with legal requirements or in which his own votes
having been overcome, the act adopted might impose some
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unlawful liability on him. These are generally spoken of
as minority rights. Whether the individual acts as a unit or
whether he acts in conjunction with others who make up the
minority, who might constitute a small group within the
corporation, the origin of such rights of prohibition is the
same.
Minority rights grow, not out of group rights-they are
not corollaries of corporate activity; they are individual
rights of a shareholder or the sum of the rights of several
shareholders to control in certain cases the corporate willa control exercised in this instance not in accordance with
the corporate will, but against it. It will be seen that the
law in dealing with such rights expressly assumes that there
are group rights-rights vested in the group as such and
individual rights, and that the two rights may often conflict
-differences which the law is called upon to regulate.
Correlative to the rights of the stockholders are his individual duties. Contained in these are the duties to contribute
to the corporate enterprise-to pay for shares, to respond to
the demands of corporate necessity wherever made in accordance with law. All of these principles follow as corollaries from the composite personality; the obligations are
obligations rooted in a corporate idea, and the rights are
those that follow necessarily from the very nature of the
group.
It must be recognized that the law does not concern itself
with the refinements of sophistry concerning the nature of
corporate personalities; the precise kind of body it may
have nor its spiritual attributes. It declares generally the
moment at which the law recognizes the existence of corporate personality, but from that moment it has before it a
subject with which it deals, a subject against which it will
enforce not merely the individual rights of its members, but
the rights of those who deal with it-the rights of creditors
and others. With the consequences of corporate personality, however, the law has much to do, for whatever deductions may be made from the theorem, what corollaries may
be said to flow from it, must inevitably be made. Having
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adopted a principle, however, all of its consequences may
be followed with more or less rigidity. The consequences
of an unsettled view of the essential nature of the corporation are, in a jurisdiction like the United States, widely
divergent conceptions of individual rights'and of corporate
rights in each jurisdiction.
When facts present themselves, they appear, if unrelated
to principles, as isolated phenomena, each to be dealt with,
much in its own way. Facts, however, are rarely absolute.
They appear almost always as members of a chain of causation, to interpret which intelligently, it is necessary to have
the beginning, and to foresee the end of the chain. If a
principle be adopted as a working principle, assuming it to
be feasible, and assuming it to offer good results, it reduces
the facts that may be brought within its range from chaos
to order. The nature of the corporation, it happens, lends
itself to a priori speculation; it offers a basis from which
the necessary consequences may logically follow without
straining and without perverting the facts. Thus the corporation is a person-a composite person. Its rights instead
of being general like those of individuals are special and
definitely limited by law and by the nature of things within
a certain circumscribed sphere. Within that sphere its
capacity for action is undoubtedly greater than that of any
individual could possibly be. Being a composite individual,
there is necessary the adjustment of individual and corporate
activities. From the main principle easily follow the exclusion of individual influence from any strictly corporate
activity, and the exclusion of the corporation from encroachment on any domain purely individual. The life of
an individual is comparatively free from the scrutiny of the
law. His private life is what he makes it, and he has an
absolute right to screen it if he wish, from public notice.
His expenditures, his actions, the activities in which he may
choose to indulge, so long as they are lawful, are matters
with which the law is not concerned. He may, according to
the views of his friends, have false ideas concerning the
education of his children; he may drop his shoe business
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and become a tailor, or cease to be a tailor and write verse.
The law is indifferent.
With a corporation it is quite otherwise. With the internal life of the corporation the law has everything to do.
With some kinds of corporations, such as banking companies, the law is bound to watch the expenditure of every
penny of its money. It is concerned vitally with the character of the agents that such companies employ; it may even
desire to know whether they are given to horse racing or
gambling. It is not a matter of indifference to the law
whether a company ceases to do banking and starts to manage a railroad. It is intimately concerned with the transformation of an iron company into an oil company, or an
oil company into a grocery syndicate.
The juristic person requires the aid of the law to give it
an organization by means of which its purpose may be
effected. The law, conferring such privileges, defines the
manner of its organization and restricts the range of its
activities. The law consequently exercises a certain supervision over the life of the juristic person. It does not in
any sense accept the office of its guardian. It does not
assume responsibility for its acts, nor on that account grant
to those who deal with it immunity against loss. It is manifest that the juristic person will need classification; that rules
applicable to some are not applicable to others, that as
groups, as wholes, as associates, they differ widely among
themselves. The examples already given disclose that while
the same person may be a stockholder in a banking company,
a railroad corporation, a steamship corporation, the rules of
law, the attitude of the law, toward each of these corporations as such must be different. It is manifest that the law
must always make some regulations for these companies, as
such, without any consideration whatever of their stockholders, other than a due regard for their property rights.
The extent to which the stockholder can be ignored in some
cases makes manifest still farther the absolute necessity for
dealing with the group as a group.
Taking the state as the highest type of juristic person
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because of certain distinctive marks which make it superior
to all persons real or artificial, it has already been shown
that the individual as such is a matter of almost no concern.
The individuals of the nation are never recognizable. The
personality of some individual may for a time seem to
visualize the personality of the state, but that is a temporary
and accidental quality. The nature of the relations between
citizens and state is so complicated that the principal function
of the law is to define the activities of each. Its existence is
necessarily perpetual; it is far greater than that of any of the
individuals in it, and their rights in any of the property
owned by it cannot be distinguished. The property is owned
by them as an entirety, and moreover the maintenance of
those rights depends upon their maintaining themselves in a
collective state. Without it they would become the rights
of the first persons strong enough to take them. The corporation, it has been stated, is a plurality, bound into an
entity. Its body is a composite organism; its vital principle
is that of an immanent collective will, in a collective personality.
The continental systems accepted the facts long since,
and produced, at least a certain harmony in the legal treatment of corporations. It is not to be supposed that even
there it was a simple matter to effect a recognition of a
principle that to many seems occult, but when an adherence
to the views either of fictions or of loosely grouped individuals leads to the absurd result that no responsibility can be
affixed, or that if any is affixed it must be merely to the
participants in the act, the need for the principle seems
apparent. When a corporate act results in a penalty, whether
by way of fine, whether by enjoining an intended act, or
whether by restricting an act, or by restricting the future
activity of the corporation, the corporation is properly said
to be punished. It is corporate property that pays the penalty. It is corporate activity that is restricted, and if the
final decree be one of dissolution it is the corporation that
is dissolved.
It has already been indicated that there are real practical
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reasons as well as theoretical ones for recognizing the principle of the juristic person. There are many acts possible
so long as it is known that the individual who does them is
responsible, and not the collective body nor the property of
the collective body that fathers them. If, for example, the
only person concerned in the prevention of a railroad disaster is merely the engineer, railways would be very unsafe
means of travel.
In a recent prosecution of a corporation the question involved was -like this. A law made it unlawful for any
person or corporation to offer or receive any rebate or discrimination in respect of the transportation of property by
a common carrier, subject to national laws upon the regulation of commerce. The law provided further that a person
or corporation who should offer or receive such rebates
should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction should
be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars
or more than twenty thousand dollars.
The method in which innocence or guilt of the offense
provided against should be determined was somewhat complicated. Every carrier subject to the provisions of the act
was bound to print and keep open to public inspection,
schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the
transportation of passengers and property in force at the
time, upon its route. The schedules must state plainly the
places upon its railroad between which property and passengers will be carried, and must contain the classification of
freight in force, stating separately the terminal charges and
any rules affecting them. These schedules it was provided
must be plainly printed in large type and copies for the use
of the public posted in two public and conspicuous places in
the station or depot of the carrier. These schedules, etc.,
were required to be filed with a commission.
The defendant in the suit under discussion was convicted
of accepting a rate of six cents per hundred pounds, where
the public was charged eighteen cents and seven and onehalf cents were the public paid nineteen and one-half cents.
The corporation was convicted and fined. Now the method
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in which its guilt or innocence might be determined is interesting. An agent of the defendant inquired of an agent of
the railroad company what was the rate and was informed
that it was six cents, the rate paid by the defendant. It is
certain that there were methods and that the law provided
means by which the defendant could have ascertained the
correct rate; it might have seen a schedule; it might have
inquired of the Interstate Commerce Commission; it might
have performed the computations necessary upon an examination of the schedules to reach a conclusion as to the correct rates. After the facts of the case the computations
undoubtedly might have been somewhat complicated, and
the method adopted by the defendant of securing its information was one that might readily lead to an evasion of the
provisions of the law, but having found that it had not
used the means of information at its disposal the court
reached its decision; that although it is necessary to consult
two schedules to find out a lawful rate for carriage the two
schedules constitute the lawful rate; that a shipper is
chargeable with knowledge of the lawful rate on his shipment where it has been published and filed as required by
law where it is accessible to the public after using proper
diligence to ascertain such rate; finally that the defendant
was guilty of the misdemeanors charged and must pay the
fine.
In all of these problems there is no consideration whatever of stockholders, nor can one imagine in such a situation the law either desiring or being obliged to search for
stockholders. The wrong that it desires to remedy is a
corporate wrong. In the case of corporations whose operations are carried on upon such an enormous scale the court
has no method whatever of dealing with stockholders; they
are not citizens of one country; they are citizens possibly of
all the known countries of the globe. The citizenship of the
corporation is that of the country that controls it; in which
it has its organization, and in which it carries on its enterprise, and so the law is compelled perforce to regard the
corporation as an entity of some sort. If it could be satisfied
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with a fiction the fiction might be as convenient a method of
disposing of the question as any other, but it is evident that
a fiction is unequal to the demands made upon it.
It has been the endeavor in considering the conflicting
views regarding the nature of the corporate enterprise to
avoid a polemical attitude. The fiction theory none the less
is a venerable and decrepit survival of an age that had but
little use for a corporation. It afforded much amusement,
and produced much sophistry from men who were deliberating gravely how many angels might balance themselves
on the point of a needle. To them it came with a halo from
the subsidiary common law of all mankind-from the
Roman law. It speaks well for their dialectics that the
fiction has survived until now. But the law has need now
of something more than a plaything for dialectics. The
great materializing tendency will now look straight through
the theories-through the mist, at the people and the facts
themselves. It will deal with the men concerned-it is not
concerned with spirits. Like Omar, who, prayed to save the
Alexandrian library, exclaimed, "Either the books agree
with the Koran, or they do not. If they agree, the Koran
is sufficient. If they do not, they are wrong. Let them be
burnt," the law says, either the theory agrees with the facts
or it does not-if it agrees, it is of little use-if it disagrees,
it is of less use. And it has no theory. The law professes to
regard the corporation as a fictitious person, and proceeds to
fine it and convict it of misdemeanors. If in a desire to face
the actual facts we seek to deal with stockholders and property, we find that we can never reach those facts.
This much at least should have become clear. The law
must deal with the corporation as a right and duty bearing
unit. It cannot avoid granting rights to a group of men to
be exercised only while they are a group. And when it
grants so much, it must exact corresponding duties. And it
cannot go half way. The responsibility must include full
responsibility for all acts civil and criminal. It should be
recalled in this connection that an entire continent has made
use of the conception of the juristic person for sixty years.
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The reciprocal rights of shareholder and corporation must
proceed from some principle; they flow naturally from the
principle of the juristic person. Without it, they are matters
of any possible determination until a suit has arisen in
which the question is settled.
The writer could scarcely indulge the hope of presenting
except in the barest outline a theory to which Professor
Gierke devotes nine hundred pages of consistent ratiocination. And he expresses his ideas in words of such length as
involuntarily to recall the familiar tale of the lady who
stated that she had abandoned the study of German, and
upon being asked why replied, "When I discovered that 'pin'
was 'stechnadel,' I lacked the courage to keep on until I
came to elephant."
All that could be hoped was that the theory might lose
some of its spectral attributes, and might be exhibited as
offering a working basis for the solution of corporate
problems.'
George F. Deiser.
' The writer has made use, in the present paper, of the treatise upon

the Genossenschaftstheorie,by Gierke.

